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Splendid Isolation: International Humanitarian Law, Legal Theory and 
the International Legal Order* 
Abstract 
International humanitarian law (IHL) is one of the oldest and most distinctive sectors of the 
international legal order. IHL’s historical development has been unique; from one of the 
original focal points of international law it has since become a highly specialised area, 
isolated from the broader international legal academic debate. The most obvious example of 
this isolation is the lack of discussion of the place of IHL in contemporary debates on the 
future of international law such as fragmentation and constitutionalisation. The reasons for 
this isolation are manifold, however, given IHL’s position as a prime example of 
fragmentation and the issues it raises for constitutionalisation it is questionable whether these 
debates can be conclusive until they tackle the issues presented by this particular body of law. 
This ‘splendid isolation’ is detrimental to both the contemporary international legal debate 
and IHL. 
Keywords 
fragmentation, constitutionalisation, lex specialis, self-contained regimes, legal theory 
1. Introduction 
International humanitarian law (IHL), from both a historical and contemporary perspective, 
holds a unique position within the international legal order.
1
 This distinctiveness is central to 
the main theme of this article: to assess the role of IHL, or jus in bello, in contemporary 
theoretical debates on the international legal order. IHL’s presence in the legal theory 
literature is sparse. A partial explanation for this is to be found in a number of its unique 
characteristics that contribute to IHL’s absence from this debate. These include its 
exceptional status within war and law, its historical development, its early codification and, 
most importantly for this analysis, its treatment within international legal theory.
2
 In 
exploring these characteristics, this article seeks to further account for the near absence of 
IHL within current legal theory and to suggest that a more active engagement with IHL has 
the potential to enrich the debates on the future of the international legal order. 
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Contemporary debates on the nature and future of international law take several courses 
including, among others, fragmentation,
3
 global legal pluralism,
4
 cosmopolitanism,
5
 and 
constitutionalisation.
6
 These theories are innovative, albeit not entirely new understandings of 
the governance models between branches of international law. Several of these debates 
engage with the whole of public international law while others consider one particular field 
such as trade or human rights law. Nonetheless, even in sectoral theories the relationship 
between different fields of international law remains a core concern. These theories do not 
entirely depart from the theoretical questions which dominated the attention of the different 
schools of thought during the last century, but their contemporary character is important in 
understanding where IHL fits into the present debates on the future of international law.
7
  
More specifically, this article considers the place of IHL in the fragmentation
8
 and 
constitutionalisation debates.
9
 These contrasting approaches, centring on questions of 
governance and the future workings of the international legal order, are prime examples of 
current academic exchanges. Fragmentation considers the relationships between general 
international law and its specialised areas. It also examines these specialised areas in the 
context of the process by which they are all becoming more inwardly focused and divergent 
from one another. In contrast, constitutionalisation considers the increasing move in the 
international legal order from a horizontal consent based system to a hierarchal order that 
maintains core constitutional norms in its operation. Depending on the form of fragmentation 
or constitutionalisation which is advocated, these are not mutually exclusive approaches. 
Nonetheless, their contrasting basic hypotheses allows for a broad discussion of the role of 
international humanitarian law within them and, as such, within contemporary discourse. 
Jus ad bellum dominates as a central concern irrespective of theoretical approach, in 
particular in discussions on the role of the Security Council or in the rise of multilateralism. 
By contrast, its counterpart, jus in bello, receives little attention.
10
 An overview of the 
contemporary literature suggests that IHL is often either largely ignored or granted only a 
hasty examination. Since other specialised areas such as trade or human rights receive 
extensive analysis, the ‘specialisation’ argument cannot fully account for why IHL is so often 
side-lined.
11
 This lack of interaction may derive from several sources. The aforementioned 
specialisation of IHL, to the extent that many public international lawyers do not feel 
comfortable delving into its inner depths, provides one possible, albeit partial, explanation. 
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This specialisation is in part driven by the dominance of certain forms of legal expertise, in 
particular, the military and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The 
military, for obvious reasons, has a particular perspective and focus on IHL and further, has 
the resource necessary to command a complete understanding of all its rules. Similarly, the 
ICRC, with its competence driven by IHL treaty law, maintains a complete expertise. While 
military and ICRC opinion may not always correlate, their knowledge and competence, 
which extends to understanding all the rules of IHL, makes it difficult for those outside this 
realm to compete without being dismissed as ignorant of the entirety of the law and therefore 
not competent to comment.  
The resulting discomfort of those international lawyers who lack comprehensive knowledge  
and thus are less likely to engage in discussions pertaining to theory and IHL is compounded 
by the fact that within IHL circles there does not appear to be an obvious concern with the 
wider on-going debates in public international law. This lack of enthusiasm may be due to the 
perception that IHL has largely settled its relationship with other bodies of international law 
through the development, for example, of the doctrine of lex specialis.
12
 Yet, the dearth of 
IHL discourse in these broader governance deliberations cannot be understood on that basis 
alone, particularly as certain questions, such as the relationship with human rights continues 
to ignite extensive discussions and disagreements. 
This article considers several differing perspectives on international humanitarian law. Public 
international law evolves to cope with new challenges. For example, the rise in intra-state 
conflicts and transnational terrorism both required a reconsideration of some traditional 
understandings of law’s operation. However, IHL remains largely static and within the 
confines that more traditional academic voices would recognise as Westphalian international 
law. Of course, IHL's isolation could simply mean that it is insignificant to these debates; 
however, this particular position may be dismissed as an all too easy solution which, as this 
article will show, does not stand up to scrutiny.  
This article seeks to confound comfortable claims regarding IHL’s place in the international 
legal order and asks what contemporary debates tell us about this particular body of law in 
the 21st Century. As one of the originators of many of the core rules of public international 
law, from treaty interpretation to state responsibility, IHL is a prime example of how an area 
develops to become a fragmented sector of international law. On the other hand, it also 
appears to highlight the difficulties faced by a constitutionalisation process. Indeed, since it is 
staunchly traditional in its operation, it arguably provides an example of why public 
international law in the 21st century is largely unchanged from its 20th century form. 
To consider the role played by IHL in contemporary legal debate, this paper will first give a 
brief account of how this body of law interacts with other aspects of international law. As 
with other specialist fields, IHL is not absolutely settled; nevertheless, it is possible to 
broadly outline its place within the international legal order. This article aims to set a firm 
basis for considering what current discussions on the future of public international law can 
tell us about IHL and vice versa. Following an examination of the interplay between IHL and 
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international law, this piece will turn to two thematic approaches that dominate current 
international legal discourse, namely, fragmentation and constitutionalisation. A brief outline 
of the parameters of both approaches is followed by an assessment of how each has engaged 
with IHL. The article concludes with some thoughts on how IHL could make a contribution 
to these debates. Ultimately, this article will discuss and propose how engagement from both 
ends of the spectrum would benefit international law and suggest why such connections 
should be encouraged. 
2. International Humanitarian Law and the Development of Public 
International Law 
An examination of the historical evolution of public international law suggests that, for the 
great preponderance of its existence, IHL formed a core part of its content. This is perhaps 
only to be expected since IHL’s origins can be traced to ancient times and to a period prior to 
the arrival of public inter-national law which evolved out of a need to regulate the relations 
between the emerging nation-States.
13
 Grotius, Gentilli, even Blackstone, all considered IHL, 
or the laws of war, as central to the character of international law. Indeed, arguably for the 
majority of the international legal order's history jus in bello combined with jus as bellum 
comprised the mass of international law. Some of the first international efforts to codify 
international law, such as the 1886 St. Petersburg Declaration, were entirely focused upon 
IHL.
14
 Arguably, such codification was possible due to the body of customary law already in 
existence together with a willingness to negotiate on aspects that were considered vital but 
which had not, as yet, formed into customary law.
15
 Yet, while just war theories and other 
elements of jus ad bellum waxed and waned, IHL remained steadfast, if not in its content, in 
its relevance and centrality to broader international law. Today, in contrast, IHL appears to be 
located on the periphery of public international law.  
Contemporaneous to the codification of IHL, public international law began its ongoing 
exponential expansion.
16
 The extent of the expansion of international law is evident in law 
school curriculums where public international law modules now merely introduce students to 
the basics of the system. Specialised courses on everything from trade, environment, human 
rights, international institutions and IHL provide the arena in which students learn the nuance 
of the practice which underpins the international legal order. This expansion inevitably has 
resulted in increased specialisation by both the academics and practitioners of international 
law. The role of both the military and the ICRC contribute greatly to this specialisation. 
These practitioners of IHL, entirely focused on this one area of law, are partially to blame for 
this trend, as their extensive knowledge, at times, prevents others occupied by international 
law to engage with the topic. Further, because IHL is only applicable in exceptional 
circumstances – in other words in times of armed conflict – it makes it safer for public 
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international lawyers to ignore its existence, compared with other sectors which cannot be so 
easily by-passed.  This specialisation has resulted in IHL becoming one of the most highly 
focused areas of public international law and has hastened its omission from contemporary 
debate. Indeed, most general public international lawyers (if any truly still exist) would only 
claim a basic understanding of humanitarian law and, as such, are slower to engage with it 
than perhaps other sub-genres within the international legal order.
17
 While specialisation is 
also apparent in other areas of public international law, for example investment law, it is 
particularly acute within IHL. Specialisation also has the reverse effect as international 
humanitarian lawyers rarely engage with the wider contemporary debate and this has had a 
significant impact on the development of these debates. This is not intended as a criticism of 
expertise, which is necessary, but rather an observation which goes towards explaining the 
peripheral place that IHL occupies within contemporary debates.
18
 
Within the international legal order, IHL is the only area whose operation must be triggered 
before coming into operation. This may occur due to the operation of jus ad bellum, the 
operation of the Security Council or the dissent into violent conflict within a state.
19
 As with 
other specialised sectors within the international legal order, IHL relies on "general" public 
international law but, arguably, its unique status within international law sets it apart. Several 
factors, including the extent of its codification, its ancient pedigree and its general acceptance 
by all states, combine to distinguish it still further.
20
 Although human rights law, the law of 
state responsibility, international criminal law, international environmental law inter alia, all 
have a baring upon IHL, the extent of its remit during armed conflict means that it dominates 
in a way that no other area of international law appears to do.
21
 During periods of non-armed 
conflict these other areas clamour for room and authority; however during armed conflict 
humanitarian law comes to the fore and stands above, though not without the presence of, 
these other aspects of international law.
22
 
Unlike other areas of international law, such as human rights or environmental law, the 
establishment of international law’s institutions, whether in the form of the League of 
Nations, the United Nations, or even the international courts and tribunals, have been of 
secondary importance to the development of IHL. While the considerable case law of the ad 
hoc tribunals
23
 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have contributed to the evolution 
of IHL, they are not the primary drivers behind the development of this body of law. Instead, 
they have had a major role in the cementing of international criminal law as part of the 
enforcement mechanisms for both IHL and human rights law.
24
 While the role of the ICRC is 
considerable, states, not institutions, remain the primary promoters of IHL. Its absence from 
international institutions has meant that IHL is not at the centre of the debate on the 
international legal order's framework, particularly when institutions are considered central.  
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International humanitarian law's isolation manifests itself in several ways. For example, even 
though it is possibly the ideal candidate for exploring the evolution of self-contained regimes 
or lex specialis rarely, if ever, is it used as an example in general discussions on these 
topics.
25
 Cassese argues that, ‘[t]he world community swarms with myriad legal orders.’26 
While IHL is clearly a very good example of such a legal order, it has largely remained 
outside these debates. 
The role of IHL in the historical development of self contained regimes and lex specialis is 
rarely considered beyond specific occurrences or disputes. An explanation could be that that 
the sheer volume of IHL treaty law instils a sense of apprehension into many public 
international lawyers who do not feel comfortable engaging with a topic so heavily treaty-
laden.
27
 Second, there is no apparent eagerness to engage in such debates among IHL experts 
possibly because there is an assumption that IHL has largely settled its relationship with other 
areas of international law through the development of the doctrine of lex specialis and other 
mechanisms. International courts and tribunals as well as the vast majority of IHL scholars 
handle the interaction of IHL with other areas of public international law so adroitly that it is 
possible to argue that a clear, if not always definitive, understanding of their interactions 
subsists.
28
 It might also be claimed that the on-going human rights versus IHL debate (which 
arguably is not as thorny as is sometimes suggested) takes away from a wider consideration 
of what the impact of a process of fragmentation or a movement towards constitutionalisation 
may have upon lex specialis or self-contained regimes.
29
 This claim is not entirely persuasive 
since similar arguments apply equally to other genres of international law that are part of 
contemporary debates; it therefore follows that the justification that IHL constitutes a perfect 
working order is far from satisfactory. 
The exceptionalism of international humanitarian law raises issues for any theory which 
seeks to outline the possible direction of the international legal order. Nonetheless, the 
opposite appears to be the case. Indeed, the proliferation of public international law has led to 
what could be described as the ‘splendid isolation’ of international humanitarian law as an 
area apart, but within the discourse of public international law.
30
  
3. International Humanitarian Law and International Law  
This section examines how the international legal order regulates the interaction of IHL with 
other areas of international law including general international law. The general rules applied 
by courts to reconcile differences between areas of law as well as the academic debate 
surrounding these rules are explored. The aim of this section is to set the broad terms by 
which IHL interacts with other areas of international law and thus it does not seek to settle 
when, and under what circumstances, general international law or other sub-genres of 
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international law triumph over IHL or vice versa. Three main methods of differentiating 
between areas of the law, lex specialis, self-contained regimes and the hierarchy of norms, 
are discussed.  
The Fragmentation Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) lists four ways by 
which general international law settles the relationship between it and the various specialised 
international legal systems.
31
 This taxonomy provides a useful foundation to examine how 
IHL interacts with the rest of the international legal order. The four methods identified by the 
ILC are: relations between special and general law, relations between prior and subsequent 
law, relations between laws at different hierarchical levels and relations of law to its 
normative environment more generally. The first and third group are the most common 
methods by which IHL interacts with other areas of international law. Given the controversy 
surrounding such interactions, they will form a focus herein. Although this article will not 
discuss these relational incidences in detail, the conflicts that do exist in the academic debate 
illuminate some of the reasons for the isolation of humanitarian law and further aids in 
discussing the place of humanitarian law within fragmentation and constitutionalisation. 
The doctrine of lex specialis is probably the most commonly used and well-defined method 
of interpreting and understanding the relationship between IHL and general international law. 
As previously noted, IHL was at the core of the historical development of public international 
law. The well ploughed history of IHL is thoroughly discussed elsewhere and will not be the 
focus here, rather it is important to stress its historical place within public international law 
more generally and understand its development as a form of lex specialis.
32
 The historical 
absolutist division of the laws of war and laws of peace has been abandoned so that while 
IHL takes precedence in armed conflicts, ‘[i]nternational humanitarian law must be applied in 
context with other principles and provisions of international law’33 including the rules of 
treaty interpretation and the laws of state responsibility, as well as the more specific branches 
of international law.
34
 
In circumstances of conflict the question of which law is applicable is resolved by the 
doctrine of lex specialis. Where two areas of law cover the same substantive facts the more 
specific law trumps its more general counterpart. Importantly, the specific law’s application 
does not imply conflict between the two, both may require the same end, for example, the 
protection of human life, but if one is more specific on how to achieve this end or is most 
relevant to the circumstances it is applied. Alternatively, lex specialis maybe regarded as 
merely a tool of interpretation. However, knowing when to apply which law requires more 
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than a mere requirement of detail.
35
 Instead, understanding lex specialis as a method of 
exception enables a clearer view of its operation. Even if general public international law is 
also applicable, in situations of inconsistency or doubt between two areas of public 
international law, the area which possesses the more specific detail on the question at hand 
trumps the other. It is important to not consider this process as adversarial, lex specialis is 
part of the panoply of general international law. 
The ILC Report examines several cases from the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, the Permanent Court of Justice, the European Court of 
Justice, the International Court of Justice and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal to illustrate the 
use of lex specialis.
36
 The application of lex specialis in other sectors of international law 
such as trade, investment and human rights law suggests that it is with regard to IHL that it 
has most traction as a point of controversy.
37
 For example, the International Court of Justice 
considered the application of general public international law to IHL in several cases, 
including, most famously the Nuclear Weapons Case, The Wall Case and DRC v Uganda.
38
 
These cases illustrate how IHL applies within the structure of general international law and 
while the ILC Report argues that there are difficulties with it, as with most areas of law, these 
are not necessarily insurmountable.
39
 
When lex specialis operates is not always obvious. The Loewen case states that a normative 
conflict arises when the express terms of a particular law ‘are at variance with the continued 
operation of the relevant rules of international law.’40 This variance, however, may not 
always be evident. The ILC Report suggests two specific difficulties with the application of 
lex specialis. First, it is not necessarily clear what is general and what is a special law and 
second, that the nature of the relationship of lex specialis with other principles of general 
public international law such as lex posterior, normative hierarchies or matters of relevance is 
not always apparent.
41
 This illustrates the inherent problems in setting out lex specialis 
without considering other aspects of general international law, general international law and 
its interaction with specialised areas as well as specialised areas themselves. Further, lex 
specialis is a necessary part of general international law, for example, in the interpretation of 
treaties. Arguably, when lex specialis is applicable, general international law always subsists, 
even if it is on the basis that lex specialis is itself a rule of general public international law.
42
  
The first category in the ILC Report, identifying a special lex, is perhaps easier to divine with 
regard to IHL than in other parts of the international legal order. The effect of jus ad bellum 
and other triggers for its operation makes IHL’s special nature more evident than in other 
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areas of international law.
43
 Unlike trade, environmental, investment and human rights law, 
which all exist concurrently, IHL must be triggered for the regime to be set in motion and the 
doctrine of lex specialis to be applied. IHL lies dormant until called into force. This 
differentiation between IHL and other self-contained regimes is significant and central to 
understanding contemporary debates and the isolation of IHL. 
Self-contained regimes and lex specialis, though similar, are not interchangeable. The term 
‘self-contained regime’ was first used by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
S.S. Wimbledon case to describe a substantive and self-reliant body of law.
44
 In contrast, lex 
specialis requires only that a particular law be more detailed on a specific point, including a 
single treaty. Another difference between the two systems lies in their application. A self-
contained regime, by its nature, can operate independent of other regimes. While self-
contained regimes rely on general international law much of their operation is internal and 
particular to the specific legal regime, though not always in splendid isolation. Lex specialis 
operates in situations where both general and specific law, though not necessarily in conflict, 
deal with the same substantive question.
45
 This is apart from situations of competing norms. 
It is possible for a body of law to be only lex specialis or both lex specialis and self-
contained. Arguably IHL is the latter. 
The second method highlighted in the ILC Report is the relationship between lex specialis 
and other norms of international law. Simma argues that, ‘a certain degree of hierarchization 
of international norms cannot be denied.'
46
 If the character of the hierarchy is understood and 
operates effectively this is not in itself problematic, but herein lies the problem.
47
 At first 
glance, normative hierarchies appear the most problematic issue in understanding the 
relationships between norms and are relevant to the debates on fragmentation, and 
constitutionalisation. Their interaction is also important in understanding IHL’s isolation and 
the operation of jus cogens norms is a prime example of the issues which arise.
48
 
Certain jus cogens norms such as the prohibition of torture and genocide are also key aspects 
of IHL. Indeed, IHL uses core norms to maintain the minimum standards as much, if not 
more, than other areas of international law.
49
 Nonetheless, conflicts arise regarding other 
norms such as immunity or the use of force.
50
 This is an issue for IHL, which arguably is in 
line with jus cogens norms, and for other self-contained regimes such as international 
criminal law and jus ad bellum.
51
 For example, targeted killings can lead to a conflict 
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between IHL and particular rights, such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life as a 
jus cogens norm.
52
 Whilst, targeted killing is permissible under IHL, its boundaries are 
strictly defined as states must ensure their use of lethal force meets certain standards which 
keeps it within the bounds of jus cogens. While violations of these standards do occur, when 
this happens, theoretically at least, IHL combined with international criminal law ensures that 
enforcement mechanisms are in place. This is not to underplay potential tensions between 
aspects of IHL and jus cogens but rather suggests that international law has mechanisms for 
resolving these tensions in most situations and that the hierarchical value of jus cogens norms 
plays a key role in resolving such conflicts as they arise. 
Questions regarding the interaction of IHL with lex specialis and jus cogens exist, but 
international law has developed mechanisms for settling these issues. Yet, such resolutions 
are dependent on the international legal order as presently understood and are not always 
successful in settling conflicts satisfactorily. The question remains whether, if a process of 
constitutionalisation is underway or if fragmentation is occurring, what impact do these 
processes have upon IHL and the operation of lex specialis, self-contained regimes and the 
hierarchisation of norms. If these are proved to be occurring what is the impact upon IHL? In 
a fragmentised or constitutionalised system would lex specialis, self-contained regimes or 
hierarchy of norms suffice to rationalise the relationship between IHL and the rest of the 
international legal order? 
4. New International Governance Theories  
We now move to consider how IHL interacts with contemporary international legal theory 
with an emphasis on fragmentation and constitutionalisation. This analysis has two aims, first 
to understand how these debates deal with IHL and second to understand how IHL can add to 
and inform both these theories. The section also endeavours to clarify why IHL has all but 
been excluded from these discussions. Fragmentation and constitutionalisation are chosen as 
two, not necessarily opposing, but nonetheless divergent perspectives on the future shape of 
international law. As two distinct developments they should enlighten the varied perspectives 
on IHL’s development within the global legal order. Fragmentation will be considered first, 
followed by constitutionalisation. They will then be compared in terms of their impact upon 
IHL.  
4.1. Fragmentation  
Fragmentation examines two processes within international law. The relationship between 
general international law and its various specialised areas and the interaction among these 
specialised areas. Generally, fragmentation centres upon the increasingly independent and 
ultimately stand-alone systems of international, regional and domestic law that have, 
particularly over the past 40 years, emerged. Fragmentation focuses on the process by which 
these sectors are becoming increasingly distinctive and, as such, more divergent from each 
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other. The ILC Report defines fragmentation as ‘the splitting up of the law into highly 
specialized “boxes” that claim relative autonomy from each other.’53 This results in an 
increasing divergence among and volume of, self-contained regimes within international 
law.
54
 The roots of fragmentation can be observed in the Pre-Charter era and therefore it is 
not a new development; however, debates regarding the impact of fragmentation upon 
international law have, of late, gained traction. The multiplicity of subsystems, be they trade, 
human rights, environmental or most importantly from our perspective, IHL suggest that 
international law is developing its own variety of sui generis systems.
55
 The ILC’s decision to 
commission a report on the concept emphasises the importance of giving consideration to the 
possible ramifications of fragmentation.
56
 Interestingly, IHL, though later given 
consideration, is marked by its absence from the ILC Report's initial list of areas which 
illustrate the fragmentation process.
57
 This section questions whether fragmentation is 
manifest within IHL law and, if so, what impact IHL has upon fragmentation. 
Fragmentation has several features. For example, fragmented sectors of international law are 
regarded as maintaining areas of overlap with both general international law and other 
fragmented sectors. Part of fragmentation describes the internal orders developing to meet the 
particular needs of these sectors of law. These fragmented sectors have an internal, though 
not necessarily external order and they develop and integrate at different speeds. Reaction to 
fragmentation is mixed. Observers tend to either see fragmentation positively as international 
law becoming ever more sophisticated or negatively as evidence of the disintegration of the 
international legal order.
58
 According to its supporters fragmentation is a superior account of 
the present international legal orders than, for example, claiming the existence of a fully co-
ordinated system. Fragmentation seeks to reflect international law as it presently operates; it 
recognises the complexities of a regime of law which is becoming more and not less intricate. 
Lex specialis is often linked to fragmentation; indeed it is a central aspect of the ILC's Report. 
In the introduction to the Report fragmentation is described as a post World War II 
phenomena. Indeed, Jenks’ key 1953 article on the topic appears to be a favourite starting 
point for many discussions on the process.
59
 But was Jenks a visionary as suggested by 
Simma, Pulkowski and the ILC Report or, alternatively, could it be argued that IHL was 
already present as a prime example of a self-contained regime or lex specialis which 
substantiates a claim towards a trend of fragmentation?
60
 Arguably, IHL is an early example 
of the increased specialisation of a particular area of international law which has since been 
replicated in, among others areas, trade, environmental, human rights and investment law.
61
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Critically, the specialisation or fragmentation of IHL appears to have occurred earlier than in 
these other areas. 
The ILC Report's analysis of the development and place of fragmentation within international 
law is highly detailed. The Report acknowledges that fragmentation is the continuation of an 
ongoing process of specialisation and therefore is not necessarily a negative process as it is 
sometimes presented elsewhere but part of the evolution of international law.
62
 Yet, the 
Report’s reflections on IHL are somewhat limited, its first direct reference is not until page 
44. 
The ILC Report discusses the Nuclear Weapons Case and it is here that IHL is first discussed 
in detail.
63
 Arguably, starting the discussion on IHL here automatically sets it as antagonistic 
to other fragmented sectors and general international law. The Report acknowledges that the 
ICJ decided that both human rights and IHL law applied in times of war. From a 
fragmentation perspective, the concurrent subsistence of both IHL and human rights law is 
crucial. The Report examines the Court’s finding that in circumstances of armed conflict, 
where there is arbitrary deprivation of life, the lex specialis applicable is IHL, and suggests 
that an alternative interpretation is possible. The Report proposes that the judgement sets 
aside the established practice of the ICCPR which, in such circumstances, would regard 
human rights as applicable instead of IHL.
64
 The Report subsequently suggests that the ICJ 
decided the case as it did because to have only applied human rights would have been 
idealistic so the ‘Court created a systemic view of the law in which the two sets of rules 
related to each other as today’s reality and tomorrow’s promise, with a view to the overriding 
need to ensure the “survival of a State”’65 
This interesting interpretation of the Nuclear Weapons Case frankly puts IHL law in a strange 
position within the international legal order and arguably confuses it with jus ad bellum. It 
also highlights some of the reasons why IHL has not traditionally been part of the 
fragmentation debate. The “scourge of war” is indeed a bad thing, but the rationales for war 
are the basis of jus ad bellum and it is its proper application that is “tomorrow’s promise.” 
Suggesting that the ICJ considered IHL to be the lex specialis and, as such, a choice resultant 
from cruel reality appears to ignore how IHL operates. IHL is not dependent upon reality or 
promise but rather operates to ensure the symmetrical treatment of those engaged in armed 
conflict. Also, arguing that the Court ‘created a systemic view’ of the law appears incorrect to 
the extent that they applied IHL correctly, as lex specialis during armed conflict. Besides the 
IHL reasoning, all law operates in “reality”, however much the promise of utopia might 
appeal. 
Instead, the ICJ based their reasoning upon an interpretation of the law as it stands. The 
"ideal" world with no war would be the product of jus ad bellum, among other political 
developments, and that issue was not before the ICJ. This suggests a bias against IHL, not 
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based upon its content, but rather upon the uncomfortable actuality that requires its existence. 
This is perhaps part of the reason for its isolation.
66
 Of course, the opposite, a prejudice 
against human rights law in favour of IHL, also exists in some quarters.
67
 Nonetheless, in 
arguing that the ICJ was wrong, not on the basis of lex specialis, self-contained regimes, 
hierarchy of norms or indeed on fragmentation, but rather upon an idea of the Court being 
forced into a conclusion by reality, the Report perhaps missed an opportunity to engage with 
the possibility of IHL as an interesting example of fragmentation. 
Klabbers argues that international and domestic law are quite similar in their approach to 
fragmentation.
68
 Within domestic legal orders discrete areas such as intellectual property and 
family law rarely interact. Within international law, this is also the case. The converse is also 
true. In domestic law, there are areas such as contract and company law which frequently 
brush up against each other and, so too, aspects of international law. Arguably, these distinct 
areas of law are all specialised. Yet, within domestic law this specialisation does not 
inevitably lead to fragmentation and arguably this may also be the case within international 
law. Nonetheless, the need for a central governance order, an issue dealt with by 
constitutionalisation, becomes evident in taking account of the impact of fragmentation upon 
the international legal order which has only lex specialis and hierarchy of norms to settle any 
conflict. 
An ongoing process of fragmentation, whether a positive or negative possibility, requires 
some reflection on the rules that already regulate the interactions of the various sections of 
international law. While, as suggested earlier, the very fact that IHL is triggered by very 
specific events makes it easier to pinpoint when it trumps other areas of international law, the 
lack of such a trigger in other sectors may create issues as further fragmentation occurs. In 
this respect, IHL may provide an example of how to regulate a fragmented legal order. The 
development of specific rules which establish an area of law’s supremacy, be it trade or 
human rights, modelled upon the relationship between jus ad bellum and IHL, offers an 
additional tool to the international legal order in a fragmented future.  
What does this brief overview of fragmentation tell us about IHL? First, IHL, despite 
potentially being a prime example of fragmentation, is infrequently discussed. Arguably, IHL 
is such a good example of fragmentation that it is a victim of its own success. As it has 
become more and more specialised, those involved in the fragmentation debate are less likely 
to be well versed in IHL. Alternatively, the lack of discussion of IHL could be because the 
development of self-contained regimes, lex specialis and hierarchy of norms combined with 
the jus ad bellum have resolved how IHL interacts with other areas of international law in a 
systemised fashion. Nonetheless, even though IHL is both self-contained and a lex specialis, 
it forms part of the panoply of international law as one legal order. This is evident in the 
existence of human rights alongside IHL. Consequently, while IHL is a good example of the 
issues raised by fragmentation, it also contradicts the notion that a process of fragmentation 
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disrupts international governance and further indicates that fragmentation is a long-running 
process that perhaps increases the strength of the global legal order. 
The dearth of IHL in discussions on fragmentation is a missed opportunity for both. From the 
IHL perspective, fragmentation presents an opportunity to understand IHL as part of the 
evolution of the global legal order. From the fragmentation perspective, IHL is an excellent 
example of the specialisation and operation of a self-contained regime which frequently 
interacts with other areas of international law. While this brief consideration has raised more 
issues than it has settled, it does suggest more consideration from both perspectives would be 
worthwhile. 
4.2. Constitutionalisation 
International constitutionalisation is a difficult theory to summarise. The many variants and 
strands within the theory and the lack of agreement within it as to what the 
constitutionalisation of international law entails makes a neat summation impossible.
69
 
Constitutionalisation, outside any international characterisation, is a process by which a legal 
order transitions from a consent based horizontal order to one which is hierarchal and 
maintains core constitutional norms in its operation. Generally, international 
constitutionalisation comes in two forms: the first maintains that the entirety of international 
law is becoming one constitutional order while the second asserts that particular sectors of 
international law such as trade, or human rights law are in a process of constitutionalisation. 
Should constitutionalisation proceed, these two variants would have differing effects on IHL. 
This section questions whether constitutionalisation, in either form would result in change in 
IHL, how this would be manifested and what impact IHL has or should have upon 
constitutionalisation. 
As with fragmentation, thus far, IHL has not been a focus of international 
constitutionalisation. Given the dedication of some authors to arguing that sectors such as 
trade, human rights and most significantly jus ad bellum and Security Council’s role within it, 
are going through a process of constitutionalisation, its omission is remarkable.
70
 IHL has all 
but been forgotten, yet arguably it is an important aspect of any domestic or international 
constitutional order. Even those academics that suggest the entire international legal order is 
going through a process of constitutionalisation do not tackle the potential issues raised by 
IHL. Theorists arguing for sectoral constitutionalisation need to consider why IHL is or is not 
going through such a process and what sets it apart from other sectors which are suggested to 
be constitutionalising. This section considers what these issues are and suggests some 
potential methods of understanding them from a constitutional perspective.  
IHL already operates within domestic constitutional orders and therefore it is not much of a 
leap as may first be supposed to establish how IHL and an international constitutionalisation 
process would interact. Indeed, customary international law ensures that states are bound to 
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follow IHL and therefore even where no formal system is established IHL already subsists 
within domestic legal orders. Though caution must be exercised, as has been argued by 
Walker, there is no reason to confine constitutionalism to the domestic realm, exact 
emulation or transposition is not recommended.
71
 
Of central concern is whether IHL is in a process of sectoral constitutionalisation or 
alternatively does it fit into the pattern of the constitutionalisation of the entire international 
legal order? Arguably, it is more difficult with IHL (particularly due to its close ties to jus ad 
bellum and international criminal law) to argue for a standalone constitutional order and this 
is perhaps why, unlike trade or human rights law, there are not any advocates of a sole IHL 
constitutionalisation process. However, if it is accepted that constitutionalisation can occur in 
human rights or trade law, there must be robust reasons why this cannot be emulated in IHL. 
If contented that the entire international legal order is becoming constitutionalised the impact 
upon IHL should be manifest within these proposals. 
Any form of international constitutionalisation requires a re-consideration of the relationship 
between IHL and other aspects of public international law. In domestic constitutional orders 
(where IHL law also applies in incidences of armed conflict) probably the closest equivalent 
are models of accommodation such as martial law or states of siege.
72
 As exceptions to 
normal practice both impact on the normal operation of a constitutional order. Models of 
accommodation have a long history in domestic legal orders. Roman dictatorship is a very 
early example of the suspension of constitutional norms to accommodate the necessary means 
to deal with emergencies.
73
 While a constitutional dictatorship may not be an ideal model and 
is not advocated here, the notion that a constitutional system enables the operation of other 
laws in times of crisis is important.
74
 These crises trigger the suspension of some, though not 
all, constitutional norms. Arguably a similar model already subsists in international law. The 
trigger effect of armed conflict upon IHL and the displacement, though not suspension, of 
other sectors of international law such as human rights provides a comparable model of 
accommodation. 
Generally speaking, for a model of accommodation to come into operation, a trigger is 
required. A set level of violence or conflict is required before constituted power holders are 
enabled to decide that martial law, a state of siege or emergency powers are necessary. In the 
case of martial law in the UK, whenever state activities could no longer function due to a 
breakdown of order, martial law was imposed.
75
 A similar, though not exactly comparable 
requirement is necessary for states of siege.
76
 Other comparable triggers are necessary in 
domestic law based around declarations of war, which are perhaps closer to Security Council 
procedures.
77
 IHL could develop a similar constitutional trigger mechanism.  
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Dicey maintained that the operation of ‘martial law’ under UK constitutional law maintained 
public order whatever the cost to property or blood yet this did not mean the total suspension 
of ordinary law.
78
 With regard to IHL the idea that ordinary law persists under martial law is 
important in an international constitutionalisation process. The separation of the laws of war 
and of peace no longer survives as both the development of lex specialis and the case law of 
the ICJ suggests. An international constitutionalised order, developing from a basis which 
would enable the continuation of the current international constitutional order, including 
those constitutional norms directly linked to human rights once IHL was in operation, would 
therefore respect traditional constitutional tropes.  
States of siege
79
 or martial law
80
 no longer operate in their original form and largely have 
been replaced by systems of emergency powers. Nonetheless, the underlying rationale, that in 
circumstances where conflict reaches a minimum level the constitutional system allows for 
the suspension of some, though not all, human rights law, is a recognisable re-occurring 
theme within constitutionalism. Not all domestic constitutional orders explicitly refer to 
emergency laws; such powers are often set out at other governance levels or within 
legislation while other states have dual systems for different forms of emergency.
81
 Whilst 
there is no ideal constitutional model of accommodation these states of exception have bled 
into international human rights as, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and other rights regimes maintain the possibility of emergencies.
82
 
IHL can be rationalised as the equivalent of a model of accommodation in international law. 
While jus ad bellum falls outside the realm of IHL, it is directly linked to it and would also 
form part of an international model. The proposition that IHL is a model of accommodation 
has been made by Gross and Ní Aolain quoting Justice Scalia's judgement in the Hamdi case. 
'Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to security in times 
of national crisis - that, at the extremes of military exigency, inter arma silent leges.' 
83
 What 
makes the proposal here somewhat different is that it is set within international as opposed to 
domestic constitutionalism. Domestic models of accommodation are not perfect paradigms.
84
 
Depending on the domestic regime, models of accommodation can continue indefinitely with 
very low levels violence or conflict which would not meet the "armed conflict" threshold 
necessary for IHL. Also, from a domestic constitutional perspective, though perhaps more 
clear-cut in international law, in situations of intrastate conflict where the differences 
between emergency and IHL are not always evident, differing triggers would have to be 
maintained in tandem. For those that advocate an existent international constitutional order, 
this is already established through the monist/dualist system of incorporating international 
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law into domestic legal orders. Nonetheless, in a process of international constitutionalisation 
with multiple governance levels, reform of the role of constituted powers holders would be 
required to fully constitutionalise the system already established by jus ad bellum and IHL. 
Jus ad bellum and IHL are bound together. Other than in instances of Security Council 
sanctioned actions (which may have to be reformed in any putative constitutionalisation 
process), a level of armed conflict is required to enable the state to use force to repel an attack 
and trigger IHL.
85
 Naturally, this requires change for both IHL and jus ad bellum, although 
reform of the substantive elements of the minimum threshold of armed conflict is probably 
unnecessary. The systems for establishing the threshold of armed conflict, by contrast, would 
probably require reform.  
A process of constitutionalisation requires the re-configuration of IHL's interaction with 
general international law. Constitutionalisation would affect both lex specialis and the 
hierarchy of norms and would incorporate core norms of constitutionalism. This presents two 
options. First, incorporating what is already occurring into a constitutional regime and, as 
such, maintaining much of the status quo. This, however, presents a quandary. If there is no 
real need for change then the current order must already be constitutionalised or at the very 
least be far advanced in the process of constitutionalisation. The second possibility, which 
presents more complications, but is perhaps more accurate, is that an ongoing process of 
constitutionalisation will occur which incorporates constitutional norms and moves 
international law into a more centralised and hierarchical system. Part of this process would 
be the entrenchment of core constitutional norms such as the rule of law or democratic 
legitimacy.
86
 
While the constitutionalisation debate does not regularly engage with the substantive and 
procedural differences within constitutionalism a process of constitutionalisation would 
require that, for example, lex specialis be re-configured in terms of constitutional norms or, at 
least, in terms of a constitutional order. This probably would not impact on the substantive 
content of IHL but it is quite possible that the conflict between it and other areas of the global 
constitutional regime would set the terms of settlement differently to the lex specialis 
principle, which currently fulfils this role. Such constitutional reforms could result in more 
clarity regarding IHL's interactions with other areas of international law, but it may also 
involve a rebalancing of these relationships.  
IHL in an international constitutional order requires a model of accommodation to replace or, 
at least, alter the operation of lex specialis or self contained regimes. One possibility would 
be to constitutionalise the 'trigger' which already subsists but would, by necessity, require 
reform building upon the current role of jus ad bellum and the processes by which the level of 
armed conflict necessary for IHL to operate is established. Obviously, such changes to the 
trigger for IHL would have to be in tandem with the development of a broader constitutional 
regime within international law which would also establish a firmer rule of law, democratic 
legitimacy, and rights regime as without these other reforms any model of accommodation 
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would be open to abuse by the holders of constituted power by a combination of militarism 
and jus ad bellum. For example, reform of the Charter to ensure its operation within 
constitutional norms would require reform of both the structure of UN organs and the legal 
regimes which underpin their decision-making processes. 
How much change within the international legal order constitutionalisation requires depends 
on whether a form of thin or thick constitutionalism takes root.
87
 At a minimum, a hierarchy 
of norms within the international legal order would have to be recognised. Further, all aspects 
of the inter-relationship between these norms and the various sectors of the international legal 
order would need to be fully rationalised. Take the hierarchy of norms; within a "thick" 
constitutional order norms such as the rule of law, democratic legitimacy, human rights and 
the separation of powers are present and ensure that a hierarchical order is maintained and 
that the legal system operates on a constitutional basis. Most importantly a constitutional 
legal order regulates the activities of constituted power holders. Arguably, this falls within 
the remit of jus ad bellum. Nonetheless the scope of IHL's operation is effected by thick 
constitutionalisation in the same manner as trade, human rights or environmental law. 
Some proponents of constitutionalisation argue that jus cogens are the core of the process.
88
 
As IHL already aligns itself with jus cogens norms this is not necessarily problematic.
89
 If a 
thick constitutional order is established, containing the norms of constitutionalism such as the 
rule of law, human rights, democratic legitimacy, separation of powers and the 
acknowledgement of constituent and constituted power holders, this may require IHL to be 
better drawn into a centralised international legal order. This may necessitate the 
establishment of a more consolidated system of control where the disparate domestic 
systems, international criminal law, the ICRC, among other bodies, are regulated by 
minimum constitutional standards such as the rule of law and democratic legitimacy. 
Arguably, at present, these relationships would not meet the standard of constitutional norms. 
For example, the operation of the ICRC and the International Criminal Court probably would 
not meet the standards of oversight required within domestic constitutional systems, though 
this is not necessarily an issue for IHL. 
What does the constitutionalisation theory tell us about IHL? As the debate has largely not 
engaged with IHL, it is difficult to establish how it would fit into a new international 
constitutional order or indeed into a process of constitutionalisation. As discussed, there are 
several possible outcomes based around the trigger for IHL's operation and its place within a 
constitutional hierarchy of norms. IHL's operation points to the existence of a crisis which an 
international constitutional order must regulate. This makes IHL's omission from the 
constitutionalisation debate all the more surprising. Any international constitutional order that 
cannot effectively tackle armed conflict arguably does not possess the elements necessarily to 
truly be described as constitutional. 
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5. Conclusion 
Contemporary debates on international law largely ignore IHL. This is to the detriment of 
both international legal theory and IHL. By tackling one of humanity's ever-present negative 
conditions, war, IHL is an essential aspect of international law, The ICJ recognised this in the 
Nuclear Weapons Case;  
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’ as the Court put it in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the 
Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22), that The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are to 
be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that 
contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international 
customary law.
90
 
No scholar or state contends that IHL is an entirely detached regime of law. General 
international law, human rights law, law of state responsibility, environmental law, 
diplomatic law, trade law all interact with IHL. As discussed at the outset, mechanisms such 
as lex specialis and hierarchy of norms enables IHL to subsist and interact with general and 
specific aspects of international law. Yet, IHL remains aloof from the debates on the future 
shape of public international law, in particular, fragmentation and constitutionalisation. This 
article has sought to articulate why this is the case and further what implications both debates 
could have on IHL.  
Its highly specialised character has meant that most general international lawyers are 
unwilling to engage with the complexities of IHL. In contrast to continuously operating 
sectors of international law, IHL is so closely associated with jus ad bellum that it is only in 
exceptional circumstances that non-specialists must deal with the field. The eternal debate 
between IHL and human rights law, which sets an antagonistic tone between IHL as 
exceptional and other aspects of international law also contributes to this isolation. It could be 
argued that neither fragmentation nor constitutionalisation processes cause difficulties for 
IHL. Since IHL is perhaps a prime example of fragmentation its parameters are already 
understood and set. If IHL is not affected beyond the hierarchical value of jus cogens norms, 
the constitutionalisation debate is irrelevant. Yet, these claims do not stand up to 
examination. Fragmentation will probably lead to a further entrenchment of law as it is 
presently understood but not without the further development of lex specialis, self contained 
regimes and a hierarchy of norms to further optimise its operation. Constitutionalisation may 
not change the substantive content of IHL but it will require fundamental shifts in our broader 
understanding of the international legal order's operation. The need for a discussion of a 
model of accommodation further emphasises the need to reconsider the relationship of IHL to 
the trigger for its operation in a constitutional system.  
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Both fragmentation and constitutionalisation deal with the entire international legal order. As 
such, IHL's absence raises questions. Arguably, until both theories address these issues, 
neither can be wholly endorsed. While IHL's specialisation has made its isolation more acute, 
this makes its inclusion in these debates all the more pressing. If the international legal order 
is evolving beyond its traditional parameters then understanding the role of IHL amidst these 
changes is important. To allow IHL to remain in splendid isolation prevents these 
contemporary debates from fully realising their potential to shape the future development of 
international law.  
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